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Abstract
In Southern Europe youngsters leave their parental home signicantly
later than in Northern Europe and the United States. In this paper, we
study the e¤ect of a monthly cash subsidy on the probability that young
adults live apart from parents and childbearing. The subsidy, introduced
in Spain in 2008, is conditional on young adults renting accommodation,
and it amounts to almost 20 percent of the average youngsters wage.
Our identication strategy exploits the subsidy eligibility age threshold
to assess the causal impact of the cash transfer. Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences
estimates show positive e¤ects of the policy on the probability of living
apart from parents, living with a romantic partner, and chidbearing for
22 year-olds compared to 21 year-olds. Results persist when the sample is
expanded to include wider age ranges. The e¤ect is larger among young
adults earning lower incomes and living in high rental price areas. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that youngsters delay household formation
because the cost is too high relative to their income.
JEL Codes: J1, H2, I3
Keywords: Household formation, Fertility, Rental subsidy, Condi-
tional cash transfer.
The authors thank for useful suggestions Joshua Angrist, Christian Bartolucci, Luna
Bellani, Sebastian Galiani, Andrea Ichino, Valerie Lechene, Marco Manacorda, Magne
Mogstad, Till von Wachter, seminar participants at UCL, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Univer-
sity of Bologna, CSEF, participants at CEPS/INSTEAD workshop, and at the IZA/CEPR
conference. Veruska acknowledges the generous support of the Marie Curie Intra European
Fellowship for Career Development while based at UCL.
1
1 Introduction
Over the past three decades Southern European countries have witnessed a
sharp increase in the fraction of young people living with their parents. In
2010, almost 60 percent of young people in the 18-34 age bracket still lived in
their parental homes in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, whilst that statistic
is below 40 percent in France, the UK, and the Netherlands, and as low as
20 percent in Norway, Sweden, and Finland.1 Late household formation is of
primary concern for policy, because it may critically a¤ect fertility rates, youth
labour supply, and the sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems.
Economic literature nds that perceived youngstersjob insecurity (Becker
et al., 2010), limited access to credit markets (Martins and Villanueva, 2006),
high housing prices, low lifetime earnings (Giannelli and Monfardini, 2003) and
economic recessions (Lee and Painter, 2013) play an important role in delaying
youngsters adult life. According to the 2007 Eurobarometer survey, lack of
nancial resources is the main reason for staying in their parental home. When
asked the reason that young adults remain in their parental home longer than
they used to, 44 percent of young Europeans reply they cannot a¤ord to move
out, and 28 percent think that there is not enough a¤ordable housing available.
In contrast, 16 percent believe that staying with their parents allows them to
live more comfortably and with less responsibilities.
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that youngsters delay household
formation because they cannot a¤ord it. We study the impact of a conditional
cash transfer contingent on young adults renting accommodation. Economic
theory suggests that, if young adults have positive tastes for independence, the
combination of income and price e¤ects of the policy would increase the propor-
tion of young individuals living apart from parents, especially for youngsters at
the lower tail of the income distribution and those who live in high rental price
areas. On the contrary, if young individuals who are observed living with their
parents actually prefer living with their parents, the conditional cash transfer
would be a prize for those who prefer living outside the nest. The income e¤ect
of the policy may also encourage young people who live apart from their parents
to engage in complementary activities, such as childbearing.
The policy under analysis has been implemented in Spain beginning in Janu-
ary 2008, in order to promote youngsters living apart from parents. The analysis
of the Spanish policy is an interesting case because Spain shares similar living
arrangements, housing market, and institutional traits with other Southern Eu-
ropean countries. The policy, called Minimum Income for Household Formation
("Renta basica de emancipacion"), o¤ers to young people in the age bracket 22-
29 a monthly monetary subsidy of e 210 for a maximum period of four years,
conditional on renting accommodation. The policy applies only after the indi-
vidual turns 22 years old. Given that individuals cannot manipulate their age,
the subsidy is as if randomly assigned to individuals around the age cuto¤.
Outcomes are estimated with a Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences (D-i-D) strategy, com-
1Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
2
paring outcomes for individuals younger and older than 22 years of age before
and after the policy implementation. Our baseline specication focuses on 21-
22 year-olds because the identifying assumption is more likely to hold for that
group, i.e., 21 and 22 year-olds would have experienced similar evolution of their
living arrangements in the absence of the policy. We also estimate the e¤ect
of the policy on samples including wider age ranges and results are arguably
invariant.
Using data from the Spanish Labour Force survey and the Household Budget
Survey, we nd that the subsidy increases the probability of living apart from
parents between 0.002-0.037 percentage points (95% condence interval) for
22 years-old youngsters with respect to 21 ones in 2008. The subsidy has a
stronger e¤ect for young adults at the lower tail of the income distribution,
and for those living in high rental price areas. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that young adults with a positive taste for independence would form
a household if they earned higher incomes or if they faced lower rental prices.
While we cannot detect any signicant e¤ect of the policy on the marriage
rate, it increases the probability of living with a romantic partner by 0.008-
0.041 percentage points. The subsidy has a stronger e¤ect for couples living
in high rental price areas. Individuals already living apart from parents, who
mostly benet from the income e¤ect of the policy, increase the probability of
childbearing by 0.017-0.131 percentage points for 22 year-olds.
This paper makes a contribution to the burgeoning literature on heterogene-
ity in living arrangements in developed countries. A branch of this literature
highlights the role of culture in shaping living arrangements. Giuliano (2007)
argues that the liberal attitudes brought by the sexual revolution allowed young
people in Southern European countries to obtain their sexual independence at
home while still enjoying the benets of living with their parents. Manacorda
and Moretti (2006) focus on parental preferences for having children living at
home, showing that if children have a preference for living on their own, some
parents are willing to trade o¤ their own consumption to bribe their children
into staying at home. While recognizing the importance of preferences in shap-
ing living arrangements, our paper abstracts from this source of heterogeneity,
and focuses on changes in the budget constraint as a result of the policy.
Another branch of the literature focused on the importance of economic
conditions, exploring the e¤ects of youngstersjob insecurity, access to credit,
housing prices, and economic recessions. Evidence on the role of job insecurity
is mixed. Becker et al. (2010) analyze the relationship between household for-
mation and job insecurity on a sample of European and Italian data, and nd
that coresident rates are positively related with youngstersjob insecurity and
parental job security. Garcia-Ferreira and Villanueva (2007), using a legally-
induced sharp increase in ring costs as an identication strategy, nd that
there is no causal relationship between youngstersemployment risk and living
arrangements. With regard to housing costs, Martins and Villanueva (2009) doc-
ument the negative causal relationship between the cost of credit and household
formation. Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002), using data on Spanish
youth, nd that the rental-equivalent values of housing services and housing
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prices are negatively correlated with the probability of living independently.
Ermish (1999) adds to the analysis the option of returning to parental home,
nding that tighter housing markets signicantly retard leaving home and en-
courage returns to the parental home. Lee and Painter (2013) show that during
recessions household formation falls by 1-9 percent. Our results conrm the
importance of economic conditions by showing that a reduction in rental costs
fosters the probability of living apart from parents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional set-
tings of the policy under analysis and its impact on young adultsliving arrange-
ments; Section 3 details the identication strategy, Section 4 outlines the results,
Section 5 analyses the robustness of the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Spanish rental subsidy
2.1 Institutional background
Announced in September 2007 and enacted since January 2008, the Minimum
Income for Household Formation is a monetary subsidy introduced by the Span-
ish Ministry of Housing with the aim of fostering youngstershousehold forma-
tion. The government expected to achieve this goal by helping young individuals
to cope with rental expenses. The policy also aimed at promoting youngsters
economic independence and geographical mobility.
The subsidy pays e 210 monthly for a maximum period of four years. El-
igibles may also benet from an additional e 120 to pay the bank guarantee
associated with the rental contract, and a one-time e 600 loan to pay the rent
deposit in case they sign a new rental contract. To appreciate the magnitude of
the subsidy, it can be useful to compare it with the average Spanish youngsters
monthly earnings. Average gross monthly earnings of young people in the 20-24
age brackets amount to e 1,100 in 2008.2 The subsidy is therefore equivalent
to almost 20 percent of the average gross salary of a young person. Moreover,
young people who receive the subsidy devote on average 25 percent of their
income to pay the rent, while they would devote 42 percent to pay the same
amount in the absence of the subsidy. Finally, the subsidy is likely to make
household formation a¤ordable for many youngsters, as the maximum a¤ord-
able rent for the average young household is e 560, while the average rent e
626. By July 2011, the subsidy was given to 35 percent of households headed
by an individual between 22 and 29 years old.3 The total cost of the program
from January 2008 to December 2011 has been e 400 million (approximately, $
523 million).
To be eligible for the subsidy, youngsters need to be in the 22 to 29 age
bracket and have a rental contract. This includes individuals who had a rental
contract before becoming eligible. Those who do not have a rental contract may
request the subsidy conditional on providing the contract signed in three months
2Source: Spanish Wage Structure Survey, 2008.
3Source: Spanish Ministry of Housing.
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time. Eligibles need to certify that they are employed, autonomous workers,
grant holders, or receivers of a periodic social benet (including unemployment
benet). The latter are also required to have worked for at least six months or
provide evidence that the social benet will last for at least six months. For all
the eligibles, the gross source of yearly income must not exceed e 22,000, which
approximately corresponds to a monthly net income of e 1,500. EU citizens
and non-EU citizens with a permanent resident permit are eligible. If several
individuals are sharing accommodation, each young adult entitled to the subsidy
receives a share of the subsidy proportional to the number of people who sign
the rental contract. Individuals who rent out from close family members are
not eligible.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The rental subsidy is a conditional cash transfer contingent on renting accom-
modation. In the standard utility maximization problem, the consumer chooses
the quantity of housing and other goods to consume subject to her budget
constraint. The cash transfer implies a parallel shift upward of the budget con-
straint proportional to the amount of the cash transfer. For eligible individuals
who live with their parents, the subsidy has both income and price e¤ects that
increase the likelihood of living apart from parents. For given preferences and
income, the e¤ect of the policy should be stronger in high rental price areas;
while for given preferences and rental prices, the e¤ect of the policy should be
stronger for low income earners. For eligible individuals who would rent ac-
commodation even in the absence of the policy, conditionality is not binding,
and the policy is likely to have only a pure income e¤ect, increasing activities
complementary to living apart from parents.
We test the following hypotheses. First, we examine whether the policy in-
creases the probability of living apart from parents among eligible individuals,
relative to ineligible. The policy can foster living apart from parents along two
dimensions, that we analyze as two separate outcomes. One occurs when young
adults move away from parents, and the other when a romantic couple decides
to cohabit.4 Second, we examine whether the probability of living apart from
parents increases more among eligible youngsters resident in high rental price
areas than for those living in low price areas. Similarly, we test whether this
probability increases more for young adults earning low income. Third, for the
sample of individuals who live apart from parents, we analyze the income e¤ect
of the policy on the probability of childbearing, an activity that is complemen-
tary to living apart from parents. Finally, we estimate the e¤ect of the policy on
labour supply and geographical mobility, other two dimensions that the policy
aimed at a¤ecting.
4New households can be formed also when couples separate, or when unrelated individuals
that previously shared a residence choose to live singly. While with the available data we
cannot identify couple separation, we explore how the policy a¤ects the probability of living
singly in the empirical section.
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Three remarks are in order. First, for simplicity, we assume the decision
process is static. However, in an intertemporal dynamic setting, 21 year-olds
may have an incentive to postpone household formation to the time they turn
22 and become eligible for the subsidy. Postponing would allow 21 year-olds to
save money and a¤ord to pay for a more expensive accommodation or to rent it
without sharing with roommates once she becomes eligible. The policy design
could provide an incentive to wait because eligible youngsters can benet from
e 120 to pay the bank guarantee associated with the rental contract, and a one-
time e 600 loan to pay the rent deposit in case they sign a new rental contract.
In Section 4 we investigate the extent to which 21 year-olds postpone their
household formation decision. Second, our theoretical analysis describes a par-
tial equilibrium. Nevertheless, the policy may induce an increase in rental prices
(Susin 2002). In Section 5, we analyze the extent to which the policy a¤ected
rental prices. Finally, previous studies documented the role of preferences in
shaping living arrangements (Giuliano 2007 and Manacorda and Moretti 2006).
Our analysis of the di¤erences in the e¤ect of the policy by rental prices and
income abstracts from di¤erences across individualspreferences, assuming that
preferences and rental prices (income) are not systematically correlated.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Data
Our main dataset consists of the 2006-2009 waves of the Spanish Labour Force
Survey (LFS), which surveys 65,000 households every quarter (approximately
180,000 people). The LFS sample is drawn in two stages. In the rst stage,
census areas are randomly selected and in the second stage inhabited family
dwellings within the selected census areas are selected to be part of the LFS
sample. Census areas stay in the sample until all potentially surveyed house-
holds are interviewed whilst inhabited family dwellings participate in the survey
for six consecutive quarters. We use all quarters of the 2006-2009 samples and
select four age ranges: 21-22, 20-23, 18-26 and 18-33 years old individuals. The
21-22 and 20-23 age ranges are closest to the age cuto¤, the 18-26 is the widest
age range for which all treated individuals are entitled to the subsidy for 4 years,
while the 18-33 includes the whole 22-29 treated age range, and another eight
age groups as control. The estimation sample varies from 28,185 to 413,703
individuals according to the chosen specication. The data contain detailed in-
formation on age, gender, country of origin, employment status, and household
composition. We exploit the cross sectional version of the data because the
panel version does not allow us to identify households, and therefore individuals
living apart from parents, and the individuals age, which is grouped in intervals
of ve years. To partially account for the autocorrelated over time unobservable
component we cluster residuals at regional level.
Living apart from parents is measured by a dummy equal to one if the indi-
vidual lives out of her parental home and zero otherwise. Living with a romantic
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partner is dened with a dummy equal to one if the individual lives with her
partner, and zero otherwise. Childbearing is dened only for individuals living
apart from parents because those are the only ones who experience the income
e¤ect of the policy. It is a dummy equal to one if the individual has one or
more children, and zero otherwise. For the controls, the classication of educa-
tion in the LFS includes many educational levels, without clear ranking among
them. For simplicity, we dene three levels of education: the reference category
includes all individuals with at most primary education, secondary education in-
cludes all individuals who studied any form of secondary education, and tertiary
education includes individuals with any university degree.
We also use the Household Budget Survey (HBS), a yearly survey of about
24,000 households (60,000 individuals) run since 2006 with the main purpose of
registering detailed information on individualsexpenditures. Again, we select
four age ranges: 21-22, 20-23, 18-26 and 18-33 years old individuals. Due to
the lower number of individuals in the HBS, we select all the 2006-2009 time
periods in the estimations. The estimation sample varies from 1,728 to 18,077
individuals according to the chosen specication.
Beside expenditures, HBS also collects data on individuals income. Some
individuals report the exact amount of net monthly income, whilst others report
an interval. The two variables are equally distributed. We combine them using
information on interval when the exact amount is not available.5 We exploit
the information on individualsincome to assess the heterogeneous reaction to
the policy of individuals with low and high income levels. In particular, we
dene as low income individuals those with income lower than the median.
Given that non-employed individuals typically have no income, in this part
of the analysis we select only employed individuals. From those, we exclude
the few individuals earning more than e 1,500 (as they were ineligible for the
rental subsidy) and those whose income is missing (approximately 20 percent
of the sample of employed individuals).6 The classication of education used
in the HBS di¤ers from that in the LFS. We dene four educational levels:
no primary education, completed primary education, any secondary education
(including lower vocational education) and tertiary education (university and
upper vocational education).
A potential threat to our strategy may arise because the sampling occurs
at the household level in both LFS and HBS. Aparicio and Oppedisano (2014)
5To individuals who report only the interval, we assign the average income of those that
report the exact amount within that interval.
6When comparing the distribution of the observed characteristics between the samples of
individuals who declare their income and those who do not, we nd that individuals who do
not declare their income are on average more educated (26% of them have a university degree
versus 15% of income-declaring individuals). Moreover, their predicted wages from a
standard Mincer equation including all covariates are also higher on average (843
versus 835 euros per month). We also test the e¤ect of the policy on the probability of
living apart from parents on this subsample of individuals, nding a negative and imprecisely
estimated e¤ect. Hence, the inclusion of individuals with high income and low e¤ect of the
policy in the estimation sample would reinforce our hypothesis that the impact of the policy
is higher for low income individuals.
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show that siblingsdecisions to leave parental home are negatively related. In the
presence of siblings interactions, the subsidy may indirectly a¤ect non-eligible
individuals who have eligible siblings. In order to estimate the e¤ect of the policy
net of peer e¤ects, we randomly select one individual in each household with
two or more siblings in the relevant age groups. Moreover, as individuals living
with parents are overrepresented among the youngest age groups, the strategy of
selecting one individual per household makes age groups more comparable. The
results remain highly invariant with respect to those including all individuals.7
Finally, we use the 2006-2009 waves of the Fotocasa survey, which collects
information on yearly rental prices per square meter, by region. The compu-
tation of rental prices is based on more than 1,000,000 houses. Rental prices
are computed using the methodology designed by IESE Business School. This
methodology guarantees that the computation of average prices is done using
a homogenous sample of dwellings.8 We use the information on rental prices
to analyze the heterogenous reaction to the policy of individuals living in high
versus low rental price areas and to estimate possible general equilibrium e¤ects
of the policy on rental prices. We compute the country average rental price
across the 17 Spanish regions before the policy implementation and dene high
rental price regions as those where rental prices are above the country average.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for each of the four age groups used in the
estimation. The rst panel of the table shows summary statistics of the Labour
Force Survey; panel B those of the Household Budget Survey; and panel C
Fotocasa statistics on rental prices. Di¤erences in demographic and economic
characteristics across the four samples are led by di¤erences in the average age,
which is 21.5, 21.5, 22.4 and 26.8 years old in the 21-22, 20-22, 18-26 and 18-33
year-olds sample respectively. The mean values of the outcomes increase with
age. In LFS data, when passing from the 21-22 sample to the 18-33 sample, the
proportion of individuals living apart from parents increases from 10 percent
to 43 percent, the proportion of individuals living with a romantic partner in-
creases from 6 percent to 34 percent and the proportion of individuals who live
apart from parents and have children goes from 27 percent to 48 percent. The
proportions of immigrants, high educated and employed individuals vary with
the age of the sample as well. All these variables present similar values in the
samples drawn from the HBS data. In line with the statistics for the employ-
ment rate, monthly net income also rises with average age, passing from e 835
to e 942. According to panel C, the average rental price per square meter is e
8.37. High rental price regions host between 27 and 30 percent of the sample,
depending on the age range considered. Finally, the proportion of youngsters
living in high versus low rental price areas stays stable across samples.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the baseline estimation sample, includ-
ing youngsters with 21 and 22 years old in 2007 and 2008. The summary statis-
tics are shown separately for each of the four groups dened by the combination
7Results are available from the authors upon request.
8A description of the methodology can be found at
http://www.fotocasa.es/Portals/49/Static/Tendencies/Metodologia.pdf.
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of timing of the policy and age eligibility. The rst column shows descriptive
statistics for all observations, while the other columns refer to 21 year-olds in
2007, 22 year-olds in 2007, 21 year-olds in 2008 and 22 year-olds in 2008, re-
spectively. Demographic and economic characteristics are relatively similar for
21 and 22 year-olds.9 In LFS, 11 percent of individuals in the baseline spec-
ication live apart from parents, and 6 percent live with a romantic partner.
Among individuals living apart from parents, 26 percent have at least a child.
As expected, these gures are higher for 22 year-olds than for 21 year-olds in
both years. In line with the results of the paper, these di¤erences increase from
2007 to 2008. For controls, half of respondents are male. Roughly 6 percent are
immigrants. 80 percent of the sample has secondary education and 12 percent
have tertiary education. Almost half of the sample is employed. The education
and employment status of 22 year-olds do not change signicantly from 2007
and 2008, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be driven by the economic
cycle. Descriptive statistics in panel B are similar to those in panel A. The
average net monthly income amounts to e 835, and 72 percent of the sample
earns less than the median income, which amounts to e 814. Not surprisingly,
22 year-olds earn slightly more than 21 year-olds in both years but di¤erences
are not statistically signicant. Also changes in income from 2007 to 2008 are
insignicant.
3.2 Identication strategy
To estimate the e¤ect of the rental subsidy on the probability of living apart
from parents we apply a D-i-D estimation strategy, exploiting the fact that
individuals are entitled to the subsidy only after they turn 22 years old. The D-
i-D strategy consists in comparing the change in outcomes after the introduction
of the subsidy for eligible 22 years old individuals (the treatment group) and
21 years old non-eligible individuals (the comparison group). We extend the
estimation of the D-i-D model to the 20-23, 18-26 and 18-33 age ranges as well.
This estimation strategy accounts for time trends and age xed e¤ects in the
probability of living apart from parents.
We exploit two sources of variation. One source of variation is determined
by the year the youngster is interviewed. The young people interviewed in 2006
and 2007 did not benet from the program, since the rental subsidy only came
into force in January 2008. Only 22-29 years old individuals interviewed in 2008
and 2009 could be eligible. The other source of variation arises from age. Due
to the eligibility criteria established by the law, individuals younger than 22 and
older or equal to 30 were not entitled to the subsidy. Youngsters can receive the
monthly subsidy for a maximum of four years, implying that 22-26 year-olds
are exposed to the program for four years while individuals with ages between
27 and 29 enjoy the subsidy for a shorter period of time, i.e., the number of
9According to the Spanish Population Register, the size of the 21 year-olds and 22 year-olds
groups stayed stable between 2007-2008. This constitutes additional evidence that composi-
tion e¤ects are not a¤ecting our estimates.
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months until they turn 30. For this reason, our baseline specication compares
21 and 22 year-olds rather than 29 and 30 year-olds.
Our estimates provide a lower bound of the true e¤ect of the policy. In fact,
22 year-olds are less likely to fulll the requirements to be entitled to the subsidy
than 30 year-olds. Moreover, non-eligibles 21 years-old youngsters, who are not
nancially constrained, may leave their parental home before becoming eligible
anticipating that the following year they will be entitled to the subsidy.
Throughout the paper, we estimate intention to treat e¤ects due to: (i)
lack of information on whether each individual actually receives the subsidy
and (ii) the potential endogeneity of actual treatment if there were unobserved
di¤erences between individuals receiving the subsidy and eligibles who do not
receive the subsidy. However, in our estimation we use only one dimension of
eligibility (namely, age) but there are others (employment status and income).
In order to get a better approximation of the impact of the policy on eligible
individuals we scale the estimated parameters in the spirit of Baker et al. (2010).
In particular, we divide the estimated parameters by the probability of being
eligible conditional on being 22 years of age. In the Appendix we derive this
probability, which amounts to 0.571.
We dene eligibility on the basis of the age threshold induced by the policy,
without accounting for both the income threshold and the job history criteria.
The income eligibility criterion requires individuals to earn a regular net monthly
income lower than e 1,500. Our baseline strategy relies on the fact that age is
not manipulable. Still, we need to rule out that individuals manipulate their
income for the analysis of the impact of the policy by income level. The Spanish
Labour Force Survey data do not provide information on individualsincome.
We thereby use data from the Spanish HBS to rule out manipulation at the e
1,500 threshold. Figure 1 shows the histograms of the net monthly income of 22
year-olds in 2007 and 2008. The rst observation is that the two distributions
are very similar, and the 2008 distribution does not feature any jump on the left
of the threshold as one would expect if manipulation had occurred. The second
observation concerns the distribution itself: in 2008, less than 5 percent of the
sample of 22 year-olds earned more than e 1,500 a month. In an unreported g-
ure, we replicate the same exercise for the subsample of individuals who declare
a precise income level. Also in this case, the 2008 distribution does not present
any jump at the e 1,500 cuto¤ and features a very low number of individuals
at the right of the cuto¤. Consistently, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not
reject the hypothesis of equality of income distributions before and after the
policy.
As regards job history, the law assesses that individuals who were employed
for at least six months or who have just signed a working contract, whose length
is at least six months, are eligible for the benet. Omitting the employment sta-
tus when dening eligibility does not constitute a threat to our identication
strategy. First, because employment is not a necessary condition for receiv-
ing the subsidy: eligibles include grants holders and social benets recipients.
Second, because the requirement holds only when the individual applies for the
subsidy. After that, lack of employment does not imply the benets withdrawal.
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The main assumption behind the D-i-D strategy is that the trends of the
average outcome of interest for treatment and control groups would have been
parallel in the absence of the policy. In order to support this assumption, we
show evidence that the trends were parallel before the policy was implemented.
Figure 2 shows the trends of the average yearly proportion of individuals living
apart from parents for treatment and control groups in the four age ranges (21-
22, 20-23, 18-26 and 18-33), using the 2000-09 LFS data. The graph clearly
illustrates parallel trends in living apart from parents between 21 and 22 year-
olds before 2008, with the former featuring a lower probability of living apart
from parents than 22 year-olds. In 2008, when the policy was introduced, the
two lines diverge, consistently with the results of the paper. Trends appear
parallel for the other samples as well, except for the 18-26 age group, for which
they start diverging before the policy implementation. After 2008, trends seem
to diverge for all groups, with the exception of the 18-33 year-olds sample.
There are two possible explanations for the declining trend in the probability
of leaving parental home for 21 year-olds after 2008 (upper left panel of Figure
2). First, the economic recession, which hit the country in 2008, may have
preempted non-eligible individuals from leaving their parental home. While in
2009 the likelihood of living apart from parents declined to the 2006 values for
the control group, it continued to increase for the treatment group. Lee and
Painter (2013), using US data, show that the probability of leaving home and
becoming a renter is reduced by 39 percent during a recession and falls by 1-2
percent following an increase in the unemployment rate by 1 percent. In both
cases, the impact is largest for individuals in the 21-24 age range. The observed
pattern would also be consistent with the hypothesis that youngsters who have
left their parental homes go back to their parental homes during recessions, as
suggested by Ermisch (1999). A second potential explanation for the declining
trend in the probability of leaving home for 21 year-olds in the post policy
period is that they may postpone the decision to leave parental home until they
become eligible and we discuss this possibility in Section 4.1.
To obtain an estimate of the change in household formation rates attribut-
able to the subsidy from a D-i-D strategy, we implement a regression analysis
of the following form:
Yijt = j + t + jt + Xi + "itj (1)
where Yijt is the outcome of interest for individual i of age j; interviewed at
time t, j is a dummy variable for age higher or equal to 22 and lower than
30, t is a dummy equal to one for individuals interviewed in 2008 and after,
and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cient  measures the intention to treat e¤ect,
i.e. the average e¤ect of the subsidy for the population of eligibles. Xi controls
for individualsobservable characteristics: age and year xed e¤ects, region of
residence dummies, month and year of birth binary variables, a male dummy,
an indicator for immigration status, and educational level dummies.10 In addi-
10There is no perfect collinearity between year of birth and age because individuals are
interviewed at any quarter, before or after their birthday.
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tion, the regression includes quarter of interview dummies, which capture the
"seasonality e¤ect", i.e., any systematic di¤erences in household formation rates
implied by the calendar period of the year. According to the theoretical analysis
in Section 2.2, the coe¢ cient  must be positive if the subsidy induces eligible
individuals to leave parental home.
We also assess whether the policy was more e¤ective for youngsters at the
lower tail of the income distribution. The following equation is estimated using
data from the HBS, which provides information on individualsmonthly income:
Yijtz = j + t + jt + WL+ jtWL+ tWL+jWL+ Xi + "itj (2)
whereWL is a dummy equal to one if monthly income is less or equal to median
income (e 814 for the 21-22 year-olds sample), and zero otherwise. The parame-
ter of interest is , which captures the e¤ect of the interaction between the age
dummy, the post-policy dummy and the dummy of lower than median income.
The coe¢ cient  measures the di¤erent propensity to live apart from parents
between eligibles earning less than the median income and eligibles earning more
than the median income after the policy implementation. The theoretical analy-
sis in Section 2.2 predicts that the coe¢ cient corresponding to the lower level
of income is positive.
To assess the di¤erential impact of the policy according to rental price, we
estimate the following equation:
Yijtz = j + t + jt + Hz + jtHz + jHz + tHz + Xi + "itj (3)
where the subscript z indicates the region where the young adult lives. The
dummyHz is equal to one if the average price of a square meter of rental housing
in the region of residence in 2007 is higher than the mean Spanish value. The
parameter of interest is , which captures the e¤ect of the interaction between
the age dummy, the post-policy dummy and the dummy of high rental price
in the region of residence. The coe¢ cient  measures the di¤erent propensity
to live apart from parents between eligibles living in a high rental price area
and eligibles living in a low rental price area after the policy implementation.
According to the theoretical analysis, the policy is more e¤ective for young
adults living in high rental prices areas, and thus  will be positive.
This strategy relies on the fact that the subsidy amounts to e 210, regardless
the area of residence, which allows us to attribute the heterogeneous impact of
the subsidy between high and low price areas to di¤erences in housing a¤ord-
ability. The reliability of this strategy would be threatened if some eligible
youngsters migrated to areas with lower rental price in order to benet most
from the subsidy. If migration towards lower rental price area drives up the
rental price, the denition of high/low rental price area would be endogenously
a¤ected. To rule out this concern, we dene high and low rental price areas on
the basis of the region rental price in 2007, before the policy was implemented.
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The basic idea behind the D-i-D identication strategy can be illustrated
using a simple two-by-two table. Table 3 presents the change in the probabilities
of living apart from parents, living with a romantic partner, and childbearing
(conditional on living apart from parents) between 2007 and 2008 for 21 and
22 year-olds. The rst column presents di¤erences between 21 and 22 year-olds
in 2007, the second column displays di¤erences between 21 and 22 year-olds
in 2008 and the third column shows the di¤erence between the previous ones.
Average outcomes dropped from 2007 to 2008 for 21 year-olds, whilst they
increased for 22 year-olds. The simple unconditional di¤erences indicate that
subsidy eligibility increases the probability of living apart from parents by 1
percentage points, living with a romantic partner by 1.3 percentage points, and
childbearing by 6 percentage points. These estimates are signicant at the 15,
5 and 10 percent respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Probability of living apart from parents
Table 4 presents estimates of the coe¢ cient associated with subsidy eligibility in
Equation 1. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual
is living apart from parents, and zero otherwise. Panel A presents estimates for
the 2007-2008 period and Panel B for the 2006-2009 period. In the rst column
we make use of the 21 and 22 age groups, in the second of the 20-23, in the third
of the 18-26, and in the fourth of the 18-33. In what follows, we focus on the
coe¢ cients from our favourite specication (21-22 year-olds in 2007-2008) and
compare them across di¤erent age ranges and time periods. Estimates from the
D-i-D strategy show that the probability of living apart from parents increased
signicantly by 1.9 percentage points for 22 year-olds with respect to ineligible
21 year-old youngsters. Coe¢ cients are fairly similar for all the other age ranges
and for the 2006-2009 time periods. However, two of the coe¢ cients in panel B,
which include the 2006 and 2009 year samples, are not signicant. A possible
explanation relies on the economic downturn, which worsened in 2009, reducing
further labour market opportunities for young adults. The coe¢ cients for the
2007-08 sample are consistent with preliminary evidence of the unconditional
means presented in Table 3, where the e¤ect of the policy (one percentage point)
was underestimated.
We analyze to which extent our baseline results are driven by 21 year-olds
delaying the decision to leave parental home. We add a control variable equal to
the number of months before turning 22 for young adults in their 21 years-old,
and equal to zero for youngsters older than 22, and the interaction between this
variable and the variable that identies ineligibles in the post treatment period.
If ineligible youngsters close to the 22 years old cut-o¤ delayed the decision to
leave parental home, then the coe¢ cient of the interaction between the post-
policy ineligible dummy and the number of months missing before turning 22
would be positive and signicant. Estimates indicate that the coe¢ cient of the
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interaction between the post-policy dummy and the number of months missing
before turning 22 is negative, very close to zero and not signicant, suggesting
limited postponement.11
Figure 3 shows the estimated propensity to leave home for di¤erent age
groups (20, 21 and 22 year-olds) with lines tted separately for months before
and after January 2008. Given that the cost of postponing is higher for 20 year-
olds than for 21 year-olds, the comparison between 20 and 21 year-olds is useful
to rule out postponement e¤ects. Visually, it appears that 21 year-olds reduced
their propensity to live apart from parents more than 20 year-olds, but they also
increased it more sharply before 2008. It appears that the post-policy decline
in the probability of living apart from parents o¤sets the pre-policy increase for
21 years-old as much as for 20, suggesting that the economic downturn may be
the common shock to these trends. This interpretation would also be consistent
with the fact that the e¤ect of the policy is not signicant in 2009, when the
recession worsened.
If young adults postponed the decision to leave parental home to the time
they turn eligible, they would save money to a¤ord a more expensive accom-
modation or to live alone without sharing it with roommates. As an additional
check on the postponement option, we check whether rental expenditures in-
crease and whether young adults are more likely to live singly. We do not nd
any evidence that this is the case. In fact, as we discuss in the next section,
there is some evidence for higher incentives to share accommodation.
Scaling the coe¢ cients of the baseline specication by the probability of
being eligible conditional on being 22 years of age, the D-i-D e¤ect of the policy
on the probability of living apart from parents is 3.3 percentage points. Relative
to the baseline rate of youngsters living on their own (14.9 percent), this implies
that the policy increases the probability of living apart from parents for entitled
22 year-olds by 22.1 percent in 2008. Positive and signicant e¤ects are also
found with the other age groups. The coe¢ cient for the 18-26 year-olds sample
is the largest, probably because of the pre-existing trend. The reduction in the
estimated coe¢ cient for the 18-33 year-olds sample may respond to 27-29 being
less intensively a¤ected by the policy.
Overall, the estimated e¤ects of economic conditions on living arrangements
di¤er across studies. Garcia-Ferreira and Villanueva (2007) nd inconclusive ev-
idence on the link between job insecurity and the probability of leaving parental
home. Switching from a xed-term to a permanent job contract seems to have
a positive e¤ect on the probability of leaving parental home for 20-25 years old.
The magnitude of the estimated e¤ect is very similar to ours but their coe¢ -
cient is non-signicant. Martins and Villanueva (2009) nd that a one percent
decrease in the cost of a mortgage increases the probability of leaving the nest
by 0.8-3.3 percent on a sample of 18-37 years old Portuguese. In our most
comparable specication, we nd that the rental subsidy increases the proba-
bility of living apart from parents by 0.7 percent in the 18-33 year-olds sample.
When comparing the two e¤ects, one should take into account that renters are
11Results are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
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27 percent of emancipated 18-33 year-olds. Hence, given that rentals are less
frequent than acquisitions, we expect the average e¤ect of the rental subsidy
to be smaller than equivalent policies a¤ecting acquisitions. Martinez-Granado
and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) show that average housing prices and the proportion
of renters signicantly a¤ect the probability that the young lives independently,
with the associated coe¢ cients being -0.4 and 2, respectively. This last gure
indicates that, even if renting is not the prevalent option, it still plays an im-
portant role in the decision to leave parental home.
We now assess whether the policy was more e¤ective for youngsters at the
lower tail of the income distribution. We use data from the HBS survey, which
provides information on individualsmonthly income. This strategy relies on the
fact that the policy did not a¤ect individualsearnings. We test this assumption
estimating the main equation with income as a dependent variable. The e¤ect
of the policy is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in all specications.
We dene a dummy equal to one if the reported income is lower than the
median value. We interact this dummy with the treatment variable. Table 5
presents the estimates of the treatment variable interacted with the lower than
median income dummy using HBS data. The estimated interaction suggests
that young adults earning lower incomes experience a marginally higher increase
in the propensity to live apart from parents, consistently with the predictions
derived in Section 2.2. The e¤ect is signicant in three specications out of
four, showing that the probability of living apart from parents increases by 8.4
percentage points for individuals who earn less than the median income in the
baseline specication.12
In the third specication we test whether the e¤ect of the policy is sharper
for youngsters who live in high rental price regions than for those who live
in low rental price ones. Table 6 shows the estimates of the treatment e¤ect
interacted with the dummy for living in a region with higher than the country
average rental price. The interaction between the treatment dummy and the
high rental price area is positive and statistically signicant in seven out of
eight specications. The estimated e¤ects indicate that eligibles 22 years-old
experience a 2.3 percentage points higher probability of living apart from parents
in high rental price regions compared to low rental price ones. This result is
consistent with the theoretical predictions described in Section 2.2.13
Living arrangements across countries features a common pattern that con-
sists in young women leaving parental home earlier than men. Policies that
alleviate nancial constraints may imply further bifurcation in the transition to
adulthood if they a¤ect womens living arrangements more than mens (Chiuri
12Results are fairly consistent when we alternatively dene the low income
dummy using the 500 and 1000 euros per month rather than median income
cuto¤s.
13 If high rental price regions feature di¤erent employment dynamics than low rental price
regions, the coe¢ cient would capture di¤erent business cycles aside from di¤erences in the
impact of the policy. We test the hypothesis of di¤erential trends in regional employment by
estimating the same equation but substituting the dependent variable with a dummy equal
to one if the individual is employed and equal to zero otherwise. The interaction of interest
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in all specications.
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and Del Boca, 2010). We investigate whether this is the case in the policy under
analysis by splitting the sample by gender. Women are 2-2.4 percentage points
more likely than men to live apart from parents as a consequence of the subsidy,
therefore conrming the intuition from Chiuri and Del Boca, 2010.
4.2 Living with a romantic partner, childbearing, and other
outcomes
We study the impact of the policy on the probability of living with a romantic
partner, and on the probability of childbearing of individuals already living
apart from parents.14
Table 7 shows the estimates of the treatment e¤ect on the probability of liv-
ing with a romantic partner. Results in the rst column indicate that the prob-
ability of living with a romantic partner increases by 2.4 percentage points.15
Dividing the estimated coe¢ cients by 0.571, we obtain the policy e¤ect for eligi-
ble 22 years-old individuals. The impact of the policy on the probability of living
with a romantic partner is 4.2 which translates into increases of 47.2 percent
in the proportion of individuals who live with a romantic partner for entitled
22 year-olds when we scale the coe¢ cient for the sample mean (8.9 percent).
Di¤erently from the probability of living apart from parents, the coe¢ cients
for this age group are statistically signicant in the sample using individuals
interviewed in 2006-2009. Given that sharing accommodation is cheaper than
living singly, the economic crisis may have reduced the e¤ect of the policy on
the probability of living singly, while increasing its e¤ect on the probability
of sharing accommodation. Indeed, the probability of sharing accommodation
increases in the 2006-09 sample with respect to the 2007-08, although the co-
e¢ cient is not signicant (t=1.43), providing additional evidence in favour of
the hypothesis that the incentive to share house expenses increased when the
recession hit deeper. The e¤ect of the policy is positive and signicant also for
the other age groups (except 18-33 in the 2006-09 period), and consistently with
baseline results, ranges between 1.1 and 2.4 percentage points.
We replicate the same exercise we did for the probability of living apart
from parents, and estimate the e¤ect of the policy for income levels below the
median and higher than average rental prices. While in the rst case there is no
evidence that the e¤ect of the policy is marginally higher for low income young
adults, estimates in Table 8 show that the e¤ect of the policy is stronger in
high rental price areas and signicant in seven out of eight specications. The
probability of living with a romantic partner increased by 2.9 percentage points
with respect to low rental price areas in the baseline specication, consistently
with the evidence presented in the previous Section.
14We do not nd any e¤ect of the policy on marriage rates.
15A possible explanation for the slightly higher impact of the policy on living with a romantic
partner with respect to living apart from parents is the lower baseline level of the probability
of living with a romantic partner. An alternative explanation is reshu­ ing: some individuals
who were living apart from parents before the policy started living with a romantic partner
after the policy.
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As the theoretical analysis in Section 2.2 highlights, the policy is expected
to have an income e¤ect and hence, individuals living apart from parents are
expected to engage more in costly activities on average. Given that childbearing
is complementary to living apart from parents, we test the hypothesis that the
policy has a positive impact on childbearing. As the income e¤ect is only present
for individuals living apart from parents, we restrict the analysis to the sample
of individuals who have left their parental home. Table 9 shows the e¤ect of the
policy on the probability of having at least one child conditional on living apart
from parents. The estimate in the rst column and panel indicates that the
policy signicantly increases fertility by 7.4 percentage points for 22 years-old
compared to 21 years-old. Again, scaling the coe¢ cients to obtain an estimate
of the policy e¤ect, the policy impact is 13 percent. Relative to the sample
mean (27.6 percent), this implies that the increase in fertility rates for eligible 22
years-old is 47 percent. This e¤ect is corroborated by the positive and signicant
coe¢ cients in the estimations with the 20-23 and 18-26 age ranges. The e¤ect
is not signicant in the 18-33 year-olds sample. A possible explanation may
rely on the fact that the e¤ect of the policy on the probability of living with a
romantic partner is the smallest for this age range.
The strong impact of the policy on childbearing may be the result of the
combination of the rental subsidy with a universal child benet, introduced in
Spain in 2007. The child benet is a one-time payment of e 2,500 to be paid
to the mother immediately after birth. All mothers giving birth from July 1st,
2007 on were eligible to receive it. The e¤ect of the rental subsidy, which made
cohabitation with a romantic partner by renting accommodation cheaper, may
have been strengthened by the child benet, which reduced the cost of having
a baby (Gonzalez, 2011). The concern that the e¤ect we nd is solely due to
the child subsidy is limited by the eligibility rules: while all mothers, regardless
their age, were eligible for the child benet, only mothers older than 22 and
younger than 30 could apply for the rental subsidy.
The policy may have additional consequences on labour supply and geo-
graphical mobility. However, we do not nd any signicant impact of the policy
on employment, hours worked, or mobility. The lack of signicant e¤ects on em-
ployment and hours worked can be explained by a combination of the economic
crisis and the rigidities of the Spanish labour market. While the economic down-
turn may have reduced opportunities to nd a job (extensive margin), the rigidi-
ties of the Spanish labour market have limited the possibility to adjust number
of hours worked (intensive margin). Our analysis does not detect any signicant
change in labour search intensity either, which could be a consequence of the
economic recession if the number of discouraged workers increases. Similarly,
we do not detect any signicant e¤ect of the policy on geographical mobility.
The policy may have ambiguous e¤ects on rental expenditures. It may reduce
rental expenditures, if it relaxes young householdsbudget constraint. Or, it
could increase rental expenditures, if it subsidizes more expensive housing. We
use the HBS data, which collect information on the real rental expenditures,
net of public subsidies, to assess the e¤ect of the policy on rental expenditures.
In an unreported table, we nd that rental expenditures declined by more than
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e 72, which is the size of the subsidy when shared between three people. The
e¤ect is signicant only in the specication that includes 20-23 year-olds. The
nding indicates that the policy was e¤ective in reducing young households
burden of rental expenditures, at least for 20-23 year-olds.
The policy could also a¤ect the choice of renting versus buying accommo-
dation. The HBS collects information on tenure status, however the fraction of
renters is too low and the sample size too small to detect signicant e¤ects on
tenure.
5 Robustness checks
To increase the condence in our results, we run a battery of robustness checks.
The D-i-D estimation is reliable under the assumption of a common time trend
between treatment and comparison groups in the absence of the reform. If this
assumption fails, our positive estimates may reect di¤erential time trends in
living arrangements between treatment and comparison groups, rather than a
true policy impact. To provide further evidence supporting the existence of
parallel trends before the policy change, we perform a placebo test and pre-
tend that the policy was implemented in 2007 rather than 2008, using the 2006
sample as pre-policy period. Di¤erential time trends in treatment and control
groups should cause these e¤ects to be signicantly di¤erent from zero. Table 10
presents D-i-D estimates of the probability of living apart from parents, living
with a romantic partner, and childbearing for those living apart from parents in
the period from 2006 to 2007. The chosen specication includes the whole set of
individual controls. The results show that none of the coe¢ cients is signicantly
a¤ected by the placebo policy. The only exception are the coe¢ cients in the
estimation of the probability of living with a romantic partner using the 18-26
and 18-33 year-olds samples. Hence, it is possible that there was a pre-treatment
trend in the di¤erence between the probabilities of living with a romantic part-
ner between eligible and ineligible in the 18-26 and 18-33 year-olds samples.
However, the magnitude of the estimates shows that this pre-treatment trend
may only account for part of the estimated e¤ect and thus, the net e¤ect of
the policy would still be positive. Overall, these results provide evidence for
the robustness of the D-i-D identication strategy, limiting concerns relative to
di¤erential time trends.
Although it is reassuring to nd that the trends are not systematically de-
viating in the pre-policy period, we may worry about breaks in the underlying
trends coinciding with the policy. This could be the case if there were other
policies that simultaneously a¤ected the treated age groups but not the control
ones. If this were the case, estimates from the D-i-D strategy would not capture
the true e¤ect of the rental subsidy because they would reect the benets of
both the rental subsidy and other policy e¤ects. The reform of the higher edu-
cational system, aimed at adapting Spanish universities to the European Higher
Education Area, slightly a¤ected the length of university studies.16 It was ap-
16The pre-reform model for university studies o¤ered rst cycle education (short cycle),
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proved in 2007, and some universities enacted it in 2008, but the whole system
was required to conform to the law by 2010. We believe this does not constitute
a threat to our identication strategy: even if some universities began o¤ering
the new courses in the 2008/09 academic year, the rst students a¤ected by
this reform will graduate in July 2012. Still, we perform another placebo test,
replacing the household formation outcome with educational level. A signicant
e¤ect of the reform on individualseducational level would raise concerns that
e¤ects on the probability of living apart from parents reect underlying changes
in educational levels. However, we nd no di¤erential e¤ects of the policy on
educational levels for treatment and control groups. Moreover, we estimate the
equation of interest excluding students as they may be enrolled in some of the
new graduate courses o¤ered after the educational reform. This does not a¤ect
our estimates.
A possible concern is related to individuals leaving parental home just after
they graduated from university. If this is the general rule, and there are more
graduates among 22 year-olds than 21 year-olds, our results could be driven
by di¤erences in graduation rates between treatment and control groups. As
we show in Table 10, estimates of a placebo D-i-D performed in the pre-policy
period indicate that this e¤ect is not signicant.
We analyze the extent to which the policy has general equilibrium e¤ects on
rental prices, following Martins and Villanueva (2009). If the policy also a¤ects
rental prices, regions with a higher fraction of eligibles should have experienced
a sharper increase in rental prices after 2008. We test this hypothesis using
Fotocasa data and assuming each region is a separate market. Panel estimates
of regional yearly variation in rental prices do not show any signicant e¤ect
of the interaction between the fraction of eligibles (measured with the yearly
proportion of 22-29 year-olds in each region) and the post-policy dummy.
Finally, when we include employment status as a control our estimates do
not change, showing that they are not driven by the di¤erential impact of the
economic recession on 21 and 22 year-olds. We also test the robustness of our
results to an alternative functional form, a Probit model. Results are consistent
in this alternative specication.
6 Conclusion
Our paper estimates the e¤ects of a cash transfer contingent on young adults
renting accommodation on the probability of living apart from parents, living
with a romantic partner and childbearing. Our identication strategy exploits
the subsidy eligibility age threshold to assess the causal impact of the cash
transfer.
D-i-D estimates show positive e¤ects of the policy on the probability of living
apart from parents and living with a romantic partner for an eligible 22 year-old
rst and second cycle (long cycle), second-cycle only, and third cycle. With the 2007 reform,
education provision was structured into three cycles: bachelor, master and doctorate. This
implies that for short (long) cycle the length of university studies increased (decreased).
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compared to a non-eligible 21 year-old. The increase is sharper for youngsters
at the lower tail of the income distribution and those living in high rental price
areas, consistent with the hypothesis that young adults in Southern Europe
delay household formation because the cost is too high relative to their income.
Additional evidence indicates that the policy also a¤ects childbearing decisions.
The stronger e¤ect of the policy for individuals earning low incomes suggests
that the program should be targeted to poorer individuals. Moreover, the higher
impact of the policy for young adults living in high rental price regions indicates
that the policy design should take into account not only individuals income but
also housing prices. This would allow the policy to remove barriers to household
formation for young adults who are too poor to a¤ord renting accommodation,
while limiting the cost of the program and its negative impact through potential
general equilibrium e¤ects.
To provide a cost benet analysis of the policy, one needs to measure the
causal e¤ect of living apart from parents on living with a romantic partner,
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Figure 2: Trends in the probability of living apart from parents for treatment and
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Figure 3: Probability of living apart from parents before and after the introduction




Age group selected 21 - 22 20 - 23 18 - 26 18 - 33
Panel A - LFS
Living apart from parents 0.149 0.154 0.245 0.536
LIving with a romantic partner 0.089 0.095 0.164 0.419
Childbearing if apart from parents 0.276 0.284 0.32 0.469
Post-treatment period 0.493 0.492 0.493 0.5
Age 22-29 0.506 0.515 0.616 0.484
Age 21.506 21.539 22.401 26.776
Male 0.506 0.507 0.505 0.503
Immigrant 0.132 0.133 0.16 0.193
Secondary education 0.807 0.808 0.774 0.707
Tertiary education 0.107 0.105 0.135 0.206
Employment 0.463 0.463 0.492 0.608
Number of observations 55,613 109,944 218,029 413,703
Panel B - HBS
Living apart from parents 0.22 0.224 0.319 0.59
Living with a romantic partner 0.094 0.097 0.174 0.442
Childbearing if apart from parents 0.229 0.24 0.271 0.442
Post-treatment period 0.475 0.485 0.485 0.49
Age 22-29 0.56 0.601 0.74 0.513
Age 21.56 21.742 23.066 27.544
Male 0.572 0.571 0.544 0.516
Immigrant 0.14 0.138 0.15 0.158
Secondary education 0.321 0.301 0.287 0.264
Tertiary education 0.188 0.2 0.256 0.343
Monthly net income 835.2 834.9 862.9 942.1
Income less than median 0.718 0.701 0.654 0.522
Number of observations 1,728 3,407 7,173 18,077
Panel C - Fotocasa
Average rental price, Euro/m2 8.372 8.372 8.372 8.372
Regions above average 2007 price 0.271 0.272 0.28 0.298
Only observations included in the baseline estimation.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the four age groups.
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Age 21-22 21 22 21 22
Year 2007-08 2007 2007 2008 2008
Panel A - LFS
Living apart from parents 0.156 0.146 0.168 0.131 0.179
Living with a romantic partner 0.093 0.085 0.1 0.072 0.113
Chidbearing if apart from parents 0.271 0.26 0.284 0.215 0.308
Year 2008 0.497 0 0 1 1
Age 22 0.51 0 1 0 1
Age 21.51 21 22 21 22
Male 0.506 0.511 0.511 0.512 0.492
Immigrant 0.135 0.129 0.117 0.158 0.138
Secondary education 0.801 0.836 0.776 0.835 0.76
Tertiary education 0.108 0.078 0.14 0.066 0.146
Employment 0.484 0.473 0.513 0.434 0.513
Number of observations 28,185 7,064 7,102 6,772 7,175
Panel B - HBS
Living apart from parents 0.220 0.175 0.232 0.221 0.244
Living with a romantic partner 0.094 0.068 0.108 0.083 0.109
Chidbearing if apart from parents 0.229 0.343 0.246 0.150 0.196
Year 2008 0.475 0 0 1 1
Age 22 0.560 0 1 0 1
Age 21.560 21 22 21 22
Male 0.572 0.584 0.561 0.561 0.584
Immigrant 0.140 0.125 0.148 0.152 0.135
Secondary education 0.321 0.436 0.341 0.282 0.309
Tertiary education 0.188 0.130 0.207 0.169 0.233
Monthly net income 835.2 801.1 818.8 850.2 871.36
Income less than median 0.718 0.805 0.740 0.669 0.658
Number of observations 1,728 399 508 362 459
Means weighted by sample weights.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the baseline specication (21 and 22 years-old
in 2007-08).
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Di¤ 21-22 Di¤ 21-22 Di¤ 21-22
2007 2008 2007-2008
Outcome
Living apart from parents 0.022 0.032 0.01
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Living with a romantic partner 0.017 0.029 0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Childbearing if apart from parents 0.037 0.099 0.062*
(0.022) (0.023) (0.032)
Note: LFS data. Means and standard errors in brackets; ** signicant at 5 percent;
* signicant at 10 percent.
Table 3: Average outcomes by year of interview and eligibility status - baseline
specication.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups selected 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Panel A: 2007-08
Age 22*Post 2008 0.019** 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.020***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
Observations 28,185 55,562 109,867 208,498
R-squared 0.176 0.178 0.244 0.384
Panel B: 2006-09
Age 22*Post 2008 0.012 0.009 0.024** 0.016***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004]
Observations 55,613 109,944 218,029 413,703
R-squared 0.168 0.175 0.240 0.383
Note: LFS data. Standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets. * signicant at
10 percent; ** signicant at 5percent; *** signicant at 1 percent. Controls include:
age, year, and region xed e¤ects, gender, education dummies, immigrant status,
quarter of interview, month and year of birth dummies.
Table 4: Probability of living apart from parents
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups selected 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Age 22*Post 2008*Low income 0.084* 0.065* 0.068** 0.034
[0.044] [0.034] [0.029] [0.026]
Observations 1,728 3,407 7,173 18,077
R-squared 0.234 0.221 0.265 0.313
Note: HBS data. Standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets. * signicant
at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1 percent. Controls include:
age, year, and region xed e¤ects, gender, education dummies, immigrant status,
provincial capital, dummy, month of interview, month and year of birth dummies.
Table 5: Probability of living apart from parents: interaction with lower than
median wage, 2006-09 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups selected 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Panel A: 2007-08
Age 22*Post 2008*High 0.023* 0.019** 0.023*** 0.017**
[0.014] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
Observations 27,915 55,025 108,898 206,801
R-squared 0.170 0.174 0.244 0.384
Panel B: 2006-09
Age 22*Post 2008*High 0.013 0.012* 0.020*** 0.014***
[0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
Observations 55,094 108,937 216,128 410,358
R-squared 0.163 0.169 0.239 0.382
Note: LFS data. Standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets. * signicant
at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1 percent. Controls include:
age, year, and region xed e¤ects, gender, education dummies, immigrant status,
quarter of interview, month and year of birth dummies.
Table 6: Probability of living apart from parents: interaction with higher than
average rental price
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups selected 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Panel A: 2007-08
Age 22*Post 2008 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.014**
[0.008] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006]
Observations 28,185 55,562 109,867 208,498
R-squared 0.122 0.133 0.187 0.314
Panel B: 2006-09
Age 22*Post 2008 0.017*** 0.011* 0.022*** 0.007
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 55,613 109,944 218,029 413,703
R-squared 0.121 0.131 0.186 0.315
Note: LFS data. Standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets. * signicant
at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1 percent. Controls include:
age, year, and region xed e¤ects, gender, education dummies, immigrant status,
quarter of interview, month and year of birth dummies.
Table 7: Probability of living with a romantic partner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups selected 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Panel A: 2007-08
Age 22*Post 2008*High 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.014**
[0.011] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Observations 27,915 55,052 108,898 206,801
R-squared 0.121 0.132 0.186 0.314
Panel B: 2006-09
Age 22*Post 2008*High 0.014* 0.010* 0.011** 0.004
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations 55,094 108,937 216,128 410,358
R-squared 0.118 0.126 0.185 0.314
Note: LFS data. Standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets. * signicant
at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1 percent. Controls include:
age, year, and region xed e¤ects, gender, education dummies, immigrant status,
quarter of interview, month and year of birth dummies.
Table 8: Probability of living with a romantic partner, interaction with higher
than average rental price
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age groups selected 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Panel A: 2007-08
Age 22*Post 2008 0.074** 0.061** 0.034* -0.008
[0.027] [0.022] [0.016] [0.009]
Observations 2,990 6,050 18,534 89,275
R-squared 0.176 0.151 0.138 0.154
Panel B: 2006-09
Age 22*Post 2008 0.050** 0.049*** 0.036** -0.008
[0.021] [0.017] [0.013] [0.008]
Observations 5,668 11,677 36,398 176,839
R-squared 0.152 0.143 0.137 0.153
Note: LFS data. Standard errors clustered at regional level in brackets. * signicant
at 10 percent; ** signicant at 5 percent; *** signicant at 1 percent. Controls include:
age, year, and region xed e¤ects, gender, education dummies, immigrant status,
quarter of interview, month and year of birth dummies.
Table 9: Probability of childbearing for those who live apart from parents
Years 2006-07 2006-07 2006-07 2006-07
Age groups 21-22 20-23 18-26 18-33
Living apart from par-
ents
Age 22*2007 -0.006 -0.005 0.01 0.01
[0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 28,061 55,389 109,481 205,780
R-squared 0.175 0.183 0.241 0.381
Living with a romantic
partner
Age 22*2007 0.001 0.000 0.015*** 0.011**
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Observations 28,061 55,389 109,481 205,780
R-squared 0.125 0.139 0.187 0.315
Childbearing
Age 22*2007 -0.017 -0.029 -0.018 0.013
[0.037] [0.029] [0.022] [0.01]
Observations 2,814 5,837 18,131 86,970
R-squared 0.167 0.152 0.145 0.163
LFS data. Years 2006 and 2007. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets
clustered at regional level. Controls included.
Table 10: Placebo estimates on pre-policy years 2006-07
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Appendix
We devote this section to explain how we compute the probability of being
eligible for the subsidy conditional on being 22 years of age. This probability
is the ratio between the number of 22 year-olds eligible for the subsidy and the
total number of 22 year-olds. The numerator is the sum of four components:
(1) the number of 22 year-olds employed and earning less than 1,500 euro per
month, (2) the number of 22 year-olds receiving unemployment benet, (3) the
number of 22 year-olds receiving other social benets, and (4) the number of 22
year-old students with scholarship. All these data refer to 2008, the year after
the implementation of the subsidy.
In order to compute the number of employed 22 years-old who earn less
than e 1,500, we combine data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey and the
Spanish Household Budget Survey. The Spanish Labour Force Survey contains
very reliable data on employment. In fact, this data is used to compute the
o¢ cial statistics. Using sample weights, we obtain an estimation of the number
of employed 22 year-olds, which is equal to 309,187. From the Spanish Household
Budget Survey we compute the fraction of employed 22 year-olds earning less
than e 1,500 per month, which is 81.7 percent. The product of these numbers
gives us an estimation of the number of 22 year-olds employed earning less than
e 1,500 per month, which amounts to 252,601.
The computation of the number of unemployment benet recipients presents
one challenge: data on the number of unemployment benet recipients, which
is provided by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social A¤airs, are only re-
leased in age intervals. In particular, we have information regarding the number
of unemployment benet recipients among 20-24 year-olds, which is 122,400. We
scale this number by the proportion of unemployed 22 year-olds with working
experience among 20-24 years old (19.5 percent). The latter proportion is ob-
tained from the Spanish Labour Force Survey. This gives an estimation of the
number of unemployment benet recipients among 22 year-olds equal to 23,809.
The available information about social benets, provided by the Spanish
Ministry of Labour and Social A¤airs, refers to the number of social benet
recipients among 16-24 year-olds (124,200). We scale this number by the pro-
portion of 22 year-olds over 16-24 year-olds in the population (12.2 percent).
The latter data is obtained from the Spanish Labour Force Survey and coin-
cides with the data calculated from the Spanish Town Hall Census. This results
in 15,110 social benet receivers who are 22 years old.
The available information to calculate the number of 22 year-olds getting a
scholarship, provided by the Spanish Ministry of Education, is not disaggregated
by age. Hence, the calculations are done in two steps. First, using data from
the Spanish Labour Force Survey, we compute the proportion of 22 year-olds
university students, which amounts to 6.7 percent. Second, we multiply the
proportion of 22 years old university students by the total number of university
students with scholarship, 407,189. This results in an estimation of the number
of 22 years old university students with scholarship of 27,166.
By adding the four data points described above and dividing it by the total
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number of 22 year-olds (558,441), we conclude that the probability of being
eligible for the rental subsidy conditional on being 22 years of age is 0.571.
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